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"War, a contest of men, through these acts, is made a struggle of
demons."
Albericio Gentili
De Jure Belli Libri Tres
(1612)
INTRODUCTION
A pervasive theme in contemporary society is the need for the
two "nuclear superpowers" to pursue disarmament agreements and
other accords that will reduce the danger of nuclear conflagration.
While the importance of such negotiations cannot be underestimated
it is also essential that society strive to avoid nuclear proliferation
and the dangers of nuclear confrontation among the other nations of
the world.
While there are currently only five States which are certified
members of the "nuclear club,"' the number of States that may pos-
sess such weapons at the present time, or may soon possess them, is
ominous. Nations which may fall into this latter category include
Israel;2 India;3 Argentina;4 Brazil;5 Iraq; 6 Pakistan;7 and South Af-
rica.' One recent study estimated that as many as twenty nations
1. These five States include the United States, the Soviet Union, France, China, and
England.
2. "There is broad consensus among experts in the field that Israel possesses the capabil-
ity to deploy 10-20 nuclear weapons." L. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY 142
(1984); see also Glenn, Nuclear Proliferation-Law and Policy, 76 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
78 (1982).
3. One study projects that within several years India may have the capability to produce
6-20 nuclear weapons annually. SPECTOR, supra note 2, at 55-56; see also, Scheinman, An
Evaluation of Non-Proliferation Policies: Retrospect and Prospect, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 362 (1983); Fast Breeder Reactor Starts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1985, at 23, col. 6.
4. Nye, NPT The Logic oflnequality, 59 FOREIGN PoL'Y 126 (1985); see also Poneman,
Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for Argentina, 27 ORals 876 (1984).
5. Myers, Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option, 27 ORaIs 906 (1984); see also
Nye, supra note 4, at 126.
6. Israel's destruction of Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 was a substantial blow to Iraq's
suspected effort to obtain a nuclear weapons capability. However, there is good evidence in the
last few years that Iraq's nuclear development is on track again. For example, Iraq has re-
cently obtained 12.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from France. SPECTOR, supra note
2, at 188.
7. Pakistan probably has the ability to produce three nuclear warheads per year with its
indigenously developed uranium enrichment process. This capability is likely to expand sub-
stantially in the next five years. Kumar, Nuclear Nexus Between Peking and Islamabad: An
Overview of Some Significant Developments, 21 ISSUES AND STUDIES 143 (1985): see also
Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation: A False Threat?, 10 INT'I PERSP. 9 (1984).
8. "With its own uranium enrichment plants, South Africa may now have the capability
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may have a nuclear weapons capability by 1995. 9
The threat of nuclear escalation seems most likely to arise in a
conflict between inveterate regional enemies. Unfortunately, these
nations have threatened to substantially raise the stakes by develop-
ing nuclear weapons and each threat has been followed by a counter-
threat. This pattern is most obvious in the conflicts between Brazil
and Argentina,1 ° Israel and Iraq," and India and Pakistan. 2 This
nuclear thrust and parry may have a profoundly destabilizing impact
because a nation developing a nuclear capability before an opponent
may find it "judicious" to launch a first strike before the other nation
establishes symmetry.' 3
A regional conflict involving nuclear weapons could also en-
snare superpower-allies of the nations involved, triggering a nuclear
exchange of holocaustic proportions. 4 Even a "limited" regional ex-
change would be devastating:
A handful of nuclear weapons could destroy any country in the
Middle East, as a national entity, cause hundreds of thousands of
casualties in the densely populated cities of India or Pakistan, or if
used against the Persian oil fields, undermine the economies of the
West.1 5
to produce 15-25 devices, soon maybe 40, the same size as the U.S. arsenal in 1948." SPECTOR,
supra note 2, at 304-05; see also Kapur, supra note 7, at 7-8.
9. Sakamoto, Reversing Militarized Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2 NON-
ALIGNED WORLD 400 (1984).
10. Myers, supra note 5, at 881.
11. See Note, The Sun Sets on Tamuz 1: The Israeli Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 13
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 86, 97-100 (1983); Note, Tensions Between International Law and Strategic
Security Implications of Israel's Preemptive Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 24 VA. J. INT'L L.
459 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Tensions].
12. SPECTOR, supra note 2, at 23. Future dangers include Nigeria's threat to develop
nuclear weapons as protection against South Africa's nuclear program. Okolo, Nuclearization
of Nigeria, 5 COMP. STRATEGY 133 (1985).
13. See, e.g., De Mesquita & Riker, An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation,
26 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 301 (1982). Even if symmetry can be established, the hope of
security through mutual deterrence may be chimerical. As Epstein observes:
The emergence of an additional number of nuclear powers, who might not have a
second strike-retaliatory capability but only an unstable first strike capability would
not lead to a situation of wider mutual deterrence or greater stability ... it would
greatly multiply the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, desperation,
failure of communications or by deliberate intent.
W. EPSTEIN, THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR 110 (1984).
14. Spector gives the conflict between Israel and Egypt in 1973 as an example. "It is
sobering, for example, to reflect on how the superpowers might have responded if Israel had
used nuclear weapons against Soviet-backed forces in the 1973 Middle East War, a course
Israel reportedly considered." SPECTOR, supra note 2, at 1; see also Bandman & Cordova, The
Soviet Nuclear Threats Towards the Close of the Yom Kippur War, 5 JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL.
94 (1980).
15. SPECTOR, supra note 2, at 1.
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Further, as the number of nations with nuclear capabilities increases,
the opportunities for terrorists to steal nuclear materials, or actual
weapons, will increase. The inadequate procedures for guarding nu-
clear installations in many of these nations makes this scenario even
more credible.
16
The concept of regional nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ's),
by which nations agree to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons,
presents great potential for avoiding nuclear confrontation.' 7 The
idea of NWFZ's originated with the 1957 Rapacki Plan in which Po-
land (and subsequently Czechoslovakia) agreed to remain nuclear
free if the two Germanies would also accede to the arrangement.,
8
In recent years support of the concept of NWFZ's has been grow-
ing."9 Yet as of May 1986, the nations in only two regions have en-
tered into formal agreements to establish NWFZ's. In Latin
America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco has entered into force in the re-
16. See Nye, supra note 4, at 127; see also Murphy, Future Threats, 7 TERRORISM 376-79
(1985).
17. Antonio Gonzales de Leon, the Mexican delegate to the U.N. Conference of the Com-
mittee on Disarmament in 1975 provides a good general definition of nuclear weapons free
zones:
A "nuclear-weapon-free zone" shall be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by
the United Nations General Assembly, which any group of States, in the free exercise
of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty; or agreement whereby:
a) The status of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be
subject is defined; and
b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee
compliance with the obligations deriving from that status.
Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in All Its Aspects:
Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, U.N. Doc.
A/10027/Add. 1 (Sales No. E.76.1.7) (1976).
18. Sakamoto, supra note 9, at 411. The Rapacki Plan was probably doomed from the
outset as Epstein concluded:
The plan was unacceptable to the Western powers, who regarded it as an attempt to
weaken their military and political position in Central Europe, since it contained no
limitations on conventional arms and forces would, in effect, amount to a form of
recognition of East Germany, which the Western powers were not willing to give at
that time, as they were pressing for a unified Germany.
EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 209.
19. This support has been expressed primarily in U.N. General Assembly resolutions.
While U.N. resolutions are not legally binding they may establish a foundation for unilateral
declarations or treaty agreements. Additionally, these resolutions can contribute to the emer-
gence of a consensus that may evolve into a principle of customary international law. H.
MOSLER, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY 90 (1980). For a discussion of
the International Court of Justice's use of General Assembly resolutions in its decisions see, T.
FRANCK & M. MANANSANGU, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE MAKING? 11 (1982).
Substantial support for nuclear free zones has been expressed in the following U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions: G.A. Res. 34/76A, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp (No 46.), U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979) (calling for a nuclear free zone in Africa); G.A. Res. 34/78, 34 U.N. GAOR
Supp (No 46.), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (calling for a nuclear free zone in Southern Asia);
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gion.2° In the South Pacific, eight of the thirteen nations of the South
Pacific Forum have signed a NWFZ agreement. However, the treaty
will not enter into force until at least eight nations have actually rati-
fied the agreement. Additionally, five nations in the region have still
not assented to the NWFZ plan.2
It could be argued that the vision of NWFZ's has simply run
into the formidable barrier of realpolitik. However, it is just as likely
that most of the resistance to NWFZ's is a manifestation of uncer-
tainty about how such zones would operate as legal regimes.22 This
Article seeks to address some of the difficult legal questions that may
stand in the way of regional NWFZ's. Among the most imposing
issues are:
1) Can a large majority of nations in a region declare their region
to be "nuclear free" despite the opposition of one or more nations
in that region?
2) Is there a principled foundation in international law to enforce
the decision of the majority against regional dissenters?
3) Can a nation that has entered into a NWFZ agreement subse-
quently decide to renounce the agreement and develop its own nu-
clear weapons capability?
4) What international legal principles, if any, can be invoked to
prevent a nation outside the NWFZ from either: a) introducing
nuclear weapons into the region; or b) threatening to use nuclear
weapons against nations in the NWFZ?
These issues, and the ancillary questions they raise, suggest the
framework for this Article's analysis. The first section of the Article
G.A. Res. 34/77, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp (No 46.), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (supporting a
nuclear free zone in the Middle East).
Furthermore, international treaty law prohibits the deployment or use of nuclear weapons
in Antarctica (The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71); in earth orbit, outer space or on celestial bodies, (Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]); and on the seabed (Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and
Ocean Floor, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 995 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter
cited as Seabed Treaty]).
20. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967,
22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Tlatelolco].
Notable nonsignatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco include Argentina and Cuba.
21. South Pacific Countries Sign an Antinuclear Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1985, at A4,
col. 1; see also Comment, The South Pacific Nuclear- Weapon-Free-Zone, the Law of the Sea, and
the ANZUS Alliance: An Exploration of Conflicts, A Step Toward World Peace, 16 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 138 (1986).
22. Lodgaard, Nuclear Disengagement in Europe: Problems of Nuclear Weapon Free
Zones, 14 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 209, 217 (1983).
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will therefore be devoted to establishing a proposed framework for a
NWFZ treaty. The second section presents two potential scenarios,
one reflecting universal consensus in favor of a regional NWFZ, and
the other reflecting less than a universal consensus. The third section
of this Article will then be devoted to establishing a proposed frame-
work in international law for a NWFZ treaty. Finally, in the fourth
section, some additional policy options that may enhance the poten-
tial for viable NWFZ's will be outlined.
I. OVERVIEW: SYSTEMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A VIABLE NWFZ
At the outset it is important to engage in some prescriptive anal-
ysis by proposing a framework for NWFZ agreements. Holst pro-
vides an excellent starting point by outlining seven operational
elements that should be included in a NWFZ agreement.23
1) Prohibition against the production or acquisition of nuclear
weapons by the States in the NWFZ.
2) Prohibition against the testing of nuclear devices in the NWFZ
or participation by the States involved in such testing elsewhere.
3) Prohibition against the deployment and stockpiling of nuclear
weapons on the territories of the States in the NWFZ.
4) Prohibition against the training of troops in the use of nuclear
weapons.
5) Prohibition against the visit and transit of military vessels and
aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard.24
6) Prohibition against the use or threat to use nuclear weapons
against any area within the NWFZ.
7) Prohibition against the use or threat to use nuclear weapons
from areas within the NWFZ.25
In addition to these components, the author would also incorpo-
rate three other elements into a NWFZ agreement.
8) A special monitoring agreement.
23. Hoist, A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Area: Conditions and Options-A
Norwegian View, 14 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 232 (1983). While Hoist's proposal was in the
context of a Nordic NWFZ, it is flexible enough to apply to any proposed regional agreement.
24. Several nations, including Argentina during the Falkland's crisis, have contended that
if a ship or submarine has a nuclear propulsion system it cannot enter another nation's territo-
rial waters without contravening an agreement not to "introduce" nuclear weapons into an
area. Poneman, supra note 4, at 876. This position should not be incorporated into a NWFZ
agreement because the purpose of any NWFZ treaty should be to prevent the potential use of
nuclear weapons. Given that a ship or submarine propelled into an area by nuclear power does
not pose that same threat, it should not be placed under the rubric of nuclear "weapons" that
are to be excluded in a NWFZ treaty.
25. Hoist, supra note 23, at 232.
Vol. 16
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9) Dispute resolution through mandatory International Court of
Justice jurisdiction.
10) Standards governing renunciation of NWFZ treaties.
The governing body of a NWFZ should be imbued with suffi-
cient legal personality to be able to enter into a special monitoring
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The agreement should include provisions for periodic and unan-
nounced spot checks of a nation's nuclear facilities, civilian power
plants, and any other facility that is either utilizing nuclear technol-
ogy, or conducting research related to nuclear technology.26 Addi-
tional means of monitoring should be mandated if deemed necessary
and may include the establishment of an International Satellite Mon-
itoring Agency under the auspices of the IAEA.27 Any party to a
NWFZ agreement that suspects that another NWFZ signatory is vio-
lating the agreement by surreptitiously developing a nuclear weapons
capability should be able to request a spot inspection of the suspected
nation's facilities by the IAEA. Such requests should be based on
good faith and a reasonable suspicion of activities in contravention of
the NWFZ agreement.
The parties to a NWFZ agreement should agree in advance to
submit any dispute related to the agreement to the International
26. This proposal would require an expansion of the authority of IAEA inspectors. Cur-
rently, the agency must give advance notice of anywhere from 24 hours to one week before
inspecting a nation's nuclear facilities. Additionally, a nation may restrict access to specific
facilities, or portions of a facility, obviating the inspectors' ability to detect the diversion of
nuclear materials for weapons research and development. Herron, Nuclear Proliferation-Law
and Policy, 76 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 93-94 (1982); see also Edwards, International Legal
Aspects of Safeguards and the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1984 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
1.
Enhanced IAEA inspection authority would, of course, constitute a greater intrusion on
national sovereignty. However, it is essential that all nations entering a NWFZ agreement be
assured at the outset that no nation in the zone will be able to surreptitiously develop a nuclear
capability. Insecurity could be fatal to any NWFZ agreement. The inadequacy of current
IAEA procedures to detect potential diversion of nuclear materials was one of Israel's primary
justifications for launching its preemptive strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor. See Tensions, supra
note 11, at 461; see also Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs on Europe and the Middle East and on
International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Repre-
sentatives, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-21 (1981) (statement of Hon. Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs, Dep't of State).
27. This proposal has been advocated by several analysts including Arbess of the Lawyer's
Committee on Nuclear Policy. Arbess, International Law Revisited: Meeting the Legal Chal-
lenge of Nuclear Weapons, 16 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 113 (1985). Additionally, the govern-
ment of France has officially proposed the establishment of an International Satellite
Monitoring Agency. Smail, Reciprocal Hostage Exchange: A Non Violent and Confidence
Building Approach to Deterrence in the Nuclear Age, 10 PEACE RESEARCH REVIEWS 62 (1984).
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Court of Justice for resolution. NWFZ nations should also expressly
agree to accept International Court of Justice decisions as binding in
all such cases.
Any NWFZ agreement should contain language that ensures
stability in the region by making unilateral renunciation feasible only
in very extreme circumstances. The following language is suggested:
This agreement is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely. A nation that is a party to this agreement (inside or
outside the region) that wishes to renounce this agreement must
petition the International Court of Justice for approval. The con-
tracting parties agree that such approval should only be given if a
fundamental change in circumstances would justify the
28renunciation.
II. NWFZ SCENARIOS
A. Scenario One: Initial Universal Assent
Under this scenario, all nations inside and outside of the re-
gion 29 accede to the NWFZ. Under these ideal, some would say uto-
pian, circumstances only two primary issues are presented: 1) What
form should such an agreement take? Should a series of unilateral
declarations of a State's intent be relied on, or should a draft treaty
open for ratification by all nations be formulated? 2) Under princi-
ples of international law governing treaties, can a party who has en-
tered into a NWFZ agreement subsequently renounce the agreement
and develop nuclear weapons, or threaten to use nuclear weapons,
against a NWFZ nation?
1. Form of NWFZ Agreement. There are two basic methods
that nations could employ to create a NWFZ: 1) all nations inside
and outside of the proposed NWFZ region could unilaterally declare
their intent to respect a regional NWFZ; or 2) a draft NWFZ treaty
28. NWFZ nations must be provided with a mechanism by which disputes can be resolved
peacefully. Submission to the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,
without reservations, may provide this security. For the consequences of allowing a nation to
unilaterally define what issues are "justiciable" by the International Court of Justice see the
arguments of the United States in Nicaragua v. United States, 1984 I.C.J. 392; see also
D'Amato, Icy Day at the ICJ, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 379 (1985). The legal issues related to treaty
renunciation are discussed infra at notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
29. The scope of a "region" will necessarily be defined by the number of nations in any
given geographical area of the world that perceive it to be in their common interest to establish
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could be established for each region, with nations entering into the
NWFZ agreement through ratification.
Although the International Court of Justice has held that unilat-
eral declarations by nations are binding,3" it would be more effective
if NWFZ's take the form of multilateral treaty agreements for several
reasons. First, unified language would minimize conflicts between
NWFZ parties. There are intrinsic dangers in sanctioning the estab-
lishment of potentially over 150 unilateral declarations addressed to
a regional NWFZ. The result would likely be a bewildering crazy
quilt of interpretations of the NWFZ. While unified treaty language
would, of course, also be subject to diverse interpretations, the Inter-
national Court of Justice would be called on to interpret the ambigui-
ties of only one document, a document originally ratified by all
nations.3"
Second, NWFZ's embodied in multilateral treaties would avoid
the problems of agency. A recurring issue in the domestic law of
many nations concerns who has the authority to act as an "agent" for
a "principal" in any given contractual situation.32 In the interna-
tional context, the issue becomes: who within a government has the
authority to speak for that nation on issues with international ramifi-
cations? In the context of NWFZ's the danger is that a nation that
has "unilaterally supported" such a zone may later claim that the
individuals making the declaration were without authority, thus ren-
dering the purported assent ultra vires. A multilateral treaty would
avoid this danger by requiring formal ratification, binding nations by
international treaty law.33
Third, NWFZ's embodied in a multilateral treaty would be a
symbolic affirmation of the desire to end nuclear proliferation. The
symbolic value of the nations of the world agreeing on a common
plan should not be underestimated. Such accords may have a unify-
ing effect far greater than that of a series of discrete unilateral
declarations.
30. Nuclear Test Cases, (Austl. v. Fr., N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457.
31. Multilateral treaties are also recognized in the contemporary world as "the primary
instruments of the development of international law." C.G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW
96 (4th ed. 1965). Thus, an agreement in this form may be imbued with the most legitimacy at
the outset.
32. See, e.g., King v. Loessin, 572 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Jones v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., 158 Ind. App. 676, 304 N.E.2d 337 (1974); Keitz v. National Paving &
Contracting Co., 214 Md. 479, 134 A.2d 296 (1957). The scope of the agent's authority is also
frequently contested.
33. H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 28-30 (1955); see also Rao,
Soviet Approach to the Law of Treaties, 14 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 435 (1974).
225
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2. Subsequent Renunciation Through a Balanced Framework.
A very important issue under either scenario is whether a NWFZ
treaty signatory, either inside the region or outside, could subse-
quently withdraw from the agreement. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, es-
tablishing a NWFZ in Latin America, provides for renunciation of
the treaty if:
[I]n the opinion of the denouncing state there have arisen or may
arise circumstances connected with the content of this treaty...
which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one
or more Contracting Parties.
34
While the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a laudable first step in the de-
velopment of viable NWFZ's, the Treaty's renunciation clause may
vitiate any real security that the Treaty was intended to provide.
First, the clause allows the renouncing party to decide the issue
solely from the perspective of that nation's interests. Second, the cri-
terion upon which the nation is supposed to base its decision is so
vague as to be rendered nugatory. What events will affect a nation's
''supreme interests?" What are these "supreme interests?" What
kind of events affect a nations's "peace and security?" (Query if vir-
tually any event would not fit under this rubric.) Finally, the re-
nouncing State's decision is not subject to review and thus no matter
what motives may be involved in a State's decision, it is still allowed
to withdraw from the agreement.
Open-ended treaty obligations such as those in the Treaty of
Tlatelolco are likely to undermine the establishment of a successful
NWFZ. Because nations are provided with an easy "out" from their
treaty obligations it is less likely that any other nation in the region
can rely on the agreement to keep the area nuclear free.
Fortunately, there are well recognized principles of international
law which can aid us in structuring a renunciation clause that will
maximize the security of all NWFZ parties. The proposed renuncia-
tion clause differs in two ways from its counterpart in the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. First, it requires a judicial determination that renuncia-
tion should be permitted. Second, it establishes a strong presumption
against renunciation, requiring a "fundamental change in circum-
stances" to justify such a decision. Admittedly, the standard is very
stringent. However, nations are not likely to support a NWFZ in
earnest unless they are protected against sudden and arbitrary renun-
ciations by other nations. Nations would most likely be persuaded to
34. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 20, at art. 30.
Vol. 16
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1986], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss2/9
NWFZ's: AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
accede to the rules proposed for renunciation because they conform
to two generally recognized international legal principles.
One of the most widely recognized and respected mandates of
international law is the principle of pacta sunt servanda, requiring
that treaty obligations be performed in good faith.35 The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) expressly
incorporates this mandate.36 Furthermore, it was held in the Sap-
phire arbitral award that "[i]t is a fundamental principle of law,
which is constantly being proclaimed by international courts, that
contractual undertakings must be respected. The rule pacta sunt ser-
vanda is the basis of every contractual relationship."37
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, as incorporated into the pro-
posed renunciation clause, would obligate a party to a NWFZ treaty
"to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
[the] treaty."38 Pacta sunt servanda in this context would serve the
salutary purpose of ensuring against precipitous unilateral with-
drawal from treaty obligations.
The "good faith" requirement of pacta sunt servanda would re-
quire a NWFZ party continue to meet its treaty obligations unless a
fundamental change in circumstances occurred. This requirement is
embodied in the principle of rebus sic stantibus.39 The Vienna Con-
vention provides a useful set of standards for determining when rebus
sic stantibus may be invoked:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty
and which was not forseen by the parties may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essen-
tial basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; and
b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent
35. Rao, supra note 33, at 400; see generally A. VAMVOUKoS, TERMINATION OF TREA-
TIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS AND DESUETUDE
(1985).
36. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 289 [hereinafter cited as
Vienna Convention],
37. Sapphire-N.I.O.C. Arbitration, 35 INT'L L. REV. 136, 181 (1963); see also Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1977) (the maximpacta sunt
servanda should be viewed as a fundamental principle of international law).
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, at art. 18.
39. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 35; see also J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1010-76 (2d ed. 1981); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v.
Ice.) 1973 I.C.J. 18.
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of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 4°
The Vienna Convention standards, incorporating principles of
rebus sic stantibus, may provide the assurances necessary to prevent
mercurial withdrawals from a NWFZ.4 1
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, at art. 62.
41. This conclusion can be confirmed by applying the Vienna Convention standards to
three hypotheticals. Hypothetical # 1: State X and State Y are regional members of a NWFZ
agreement. Five months after both parties have ratified the NWFZ treaty State X becomes
bellicose, threatening aggressive actions against Y. State Y seeks to abrogate its NWFZ com-
mitments, declaring it essential either to develop nuclear weapons to protect itself, or at least
essential to retain the right to develop such weapons in the future.
Result: Under the proposed renunciation clause and Article 62 of the Vienna Convention,
the International Court of Justice would likely deny the request to withdraw. In the absence of
any proof of duress it can be presumed that nation Y originally entered the treaty in exchange
for a reciprocal promise by other nations in the region. The rationale for the agreement would
have been that the sui generis destructive effects of nuclear weapons justified forbearing the
right to develop nuclear weapons. The threat of aggression by X, with conventional weapons,
would likely not be found to be a fundamental change in circumstances but, rather, only the
kind of threat that a State must always anticipate. Additionally, the obligations imposed on
State Y under the treaty are not affected by X's threat. Of course a closer question would be
presented if X's threat involved a new kind of conventional weaponry with a much greater
potential for destruction.
Hypothetical #2: X and Y are parties to a NWFZ treaty. State Y is within the region.
State X is outside the region. As in Hypothetical # 1, State X suddenly threatens aggression
against State Y, utilizing conventional weaponry. State Y seeks to abrogate the NWFZ agree-
ment for the reasons outlined in Hypothetical # 1.
Result: Same as # I above. The threat of aggression with conventional weapons was
forseeable at the time the treaty was entered. The actual threat by State X is thus not funda-
mentally different from what could have been contemplated at the time the treaty was entered
into and therefore the request for withdrawal would not be granted.
Hypothetical #3: States X and Y are parties to a NWFZ treaty. State Y is located within
the NWFZ area. State X, for the purposes of this hypothetical, may be inside or outside of the
region. State X suddenly announces its intention to develop a nuclear weapons capability, and
threatens to use this capability against State Y. State Y seeks to abrogate its obligations under
the NWFZ treaty.
Result: The International Court of Justice might allow Y to renounce a NWFZ treaty
under this scenario. The locus of analysis in this situation cannot be the forseeability of the
deployment of nuclear weapons by State X but rather the reasonableness of allowing X to
develop a nuclear capability while concomitantly threatening Y with a nuclear attack. Such a
threat might be held to obviate the raison d'etre of the agreement, constituting a "fundamental
change in circumstances" that would justify renunciation. A much closer question would be
presented ifX were to develop a nuclear weapons capability but continued to pledge not to use
this capability against State Y or any other NWFZ nation in the region. The International
Court of Justice then would be called upon to determine the saliency of the increased threat
that Y's deployment would create.
The three hypotheticals outlined are not exhaustive, countless permutations could be, and
most likely would be, generated by actual State practice. However, in a general sense the
analysis here indicates that renunciation would contravene international law under most cir-
cumstances, ensuring the security for NWFZ nations that is absolutely essential.
Vol. 16
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B. Scenario Two: Regional or Extra-Regional Dissenters
The more difficult issues are presented if: 1) a majority of the
nations in a region ratify a NWFZ agreement, however, one or more
nations in that region refuse to accept the agreement, either announc-
ing their intention to develop a nuclear capability, or at least the in-
tent to keep the option open; 2) all of the nations in a region ratify a
NWFZ agreement, however, one or more nations outside of the re-
gion refuse to enter the agreement, announcing their intention to de-
velop a nuclear weapons capability, or at least the intent to keep the
option open; 3) a small combination of nations both inside and
outside the region take the actions described above.
4 2
Under the principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent prosunt a treaty is
binding only on its signatories, neither rights nor duties arise for
third party States that have not entered into the treaty.43 Thus, if
third party dissenters are to be bound by a NWFZ agreement an
independent source of authority in international law must be found.
This Article will now assay some of these possible sources. The ob-
jective will be to determine if any of them provide a principled basis
under international law to bind nonsignatories.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. Jus Cogens and Nuclear Weapons
1. Characteristics and Application of Jus Cogens. Jus cogens,
or peremptory norms of international law, are those rules "accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as [norms] from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law hav-
ing the same character."'
Several commentators have suggested that the use, or posses-
sion, of nuclear weapons would violate principles ofjus cogens, thus
making the decision of any nation to deploy such armaments illegal
under international law.45 An application of the essential elements of
jus cogens to nuclear weapons supports the position of these scholars.
42. This analysis eschews the probably impossible task of determining "how large" the
majority must be to legally bind all nations in the region. From the standpoint of "real world"
power politics it is unlikely that a NWFZ would ever be viable in a region where a large
number of nations opposed the concept. Thus, this scenario assumes substantial regional sup-
port for a NWFZ, with only one, or at the most only a few, nations dissenting.
43. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 33, at 925-26; see also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 619-20 (3d ed. 1979).
44. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, at art. 53.
45. See Note, The Jus Cogens Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.
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To establish an international legal principle as jus cogens, four
requirements are commonly cited. The principle must: 1) have a
foundation in morality; 2) be important to international peace and
order; 3) be generally accepted in the international community; and
4) serve global interests rather than those of individual States.4 6 Ap-
plying these criteria to nuclear weapons, a strong case can be made
that such weapons are illegal because they contravene jus cogens
norms.
The first criterion to establish an international legal principle as
jus cogens is that it has a foundation in morality. Jus cogens rules are
grounded in morality, reflecting elementary considerations of hu-
manity, fundamental human rights, and the dignity and worth of the
human person.47 Nuclear weapons violate these fundamental princi-
ples of humanity because they are antithetical to any conception of
human dignity. The UN General Assembly recognized the inhuman-
ity of nuclear armaments in 1961 when it declared that the use of
nuclear weapons would constitute a crime against mankind.4" Nu-
clear weapons are intrinsically immoral because they deny the values
upon which society has been built. A nuclear war, even between
"smaller" nuclear States, would devastate the social, political and
economic institutions of these nations. Thus, the first criterion for a
jus cogens norm is met because prohibiting nuclear proliferation is
based solidly on moral principles.
The second criterion is the norm's importance to international
peace and order. Nuclear weapons are an inherently destabilizing
force because the threatened development of a nuclear weapons capa-
bility by one nation in a region inexorably leads to countervailing
efforts by regional opponents.4 9 A nuclear exchange, even between
nations with small nuclear capabilities, could destroy the economic,
social, and political fabric of an entire region. Thus, nuclear non-
proliferation meets the second criterion for ajus cogens norm because
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is important, perhaps even
crucial, to international peace and world order.
63 (1980); Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L. &
COMP. L. 609 (1977).
46. Note, supra note 45, at 74-77.
47. Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
55, 59 (1966); see also Lukashuk, Morality and International Law, 14 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 321
(1974).
48. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons,
G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4942 Add. 3 (1961).
49. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
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The third criterion is general acceptance in the world commu-
nity. Despite the constant threat of nuclear proliferation there has
been growing international support for efforts to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons. Nations have expressed this sentiment in many dif-
ferent forums. As of 1985, 121 nations had ratified the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty.5° There is also evidence that most of the na-
tions that have not yet ratified the Treaty adhere to the principles of
the accord but have chosen not to sign it because they feel it is dis-
criminatory, or a piecemeal approach to disarmament. 5 Support for
non-proliferation has also been expressed through multilateral trea-
ties, such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;5 2 the Outer Space
Treaty;53 the Seabed Treaty;54 and the Antarctic Treaty." Many na-
tions have supported the numerous UN resolutions over the last
twenty years calling for an end to nuclear proliferation.56 Finally, it
is significant that no nation has ever sold a nuclear weapon to an-
other nation, despite the existence of many willing buyers over the
years.5" This consistent support for the principles of non-prolifera-
tion satisfies the third criterion for a jus cogens norm.
The final criterion for a principle ofjus cogens requires that the
norm serve the interests of the international community, rather than
those of any individual nation. Non-proliferation meets this criterion
because it is in the interests of all nations of the world to stop the
spread of weapons that could exterminate millions. The quest to
avert further proliferation may be the most global issue of our times.
50. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as Non-Proliferation Treaty].
51. See Note, supra note 45, at 81; S. WILLIAMS, THE U.S., INDIA AND THE BOMB 46-47
(1969).
52. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space, and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
cited as Test Ban Treaty].
53. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19. The signatories agreed not to "place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons ... install such weapons on celestial
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." Id. at art. IV.
54. Seabed Treaty, supra note 19.
55. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 19.
56. See G.A. Res. 1649, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4 (1961); G.A. Res. S-10/2, 33
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 4), U.N. Doc. A/Res/S-10/2, July 13, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1016 (1978).
57. Note, supra note 45, at 83. It has been reported that Egypt unsuccessfully sought to
purchase nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union in 1965. N.Y.TMES, Feb. 4, 1966, at Al,
col. 1. Libya also attempted to purchase a nuclear device from the Peoples Republic of China
but was rebuffed. H. HYKED, NEW OUTLOOK 39 (1974).
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2. Objections to Jus Cogens Principles and Applications.
Although nuclear weapons proliferation contravenes principles ofjus
cogens, if NWFZ signatories seek to use this legal construct against
dissenters several objections could be asserted. First, not all legal
scholars or State actors acknowedge the existence ofjus cogens prin-
ciples in the international legal framework. 58 Opponents have ar-
gued that there is no "source" from which to derive such a principle.
Additionally, many scholars assert that adherence to the jus cogens
doctrine would contravene the intrinsic right of parties to freely enter
agreements to govern their conduct.59 Finally, some writers and
State actors acknowledge the viability of jus cogens in theory but
maintain that no principles of international law have yet risen to that
level.6 °
These arguments can be countered in several ways. First, in
terms of finding a "source" from whichjus cogens norms can be de-
rived, it may be argued that jus cogens is a meta-legal concept, em-
bodying principles essential to the operation of any legal system. The
international system can be characterized as the transnational inter-
action of States in pursuit of political, social, and economic objec-
tives. In order to ensure the very existence of this system certain
peremptory norms must be recognized.6"
Applying this standard, nuclear non-proliferation can be seen as
a quintessential example of a jus cogens principle. Given the poten-
tially devastating effects of nuclear conflict on political, social and
economic institutions, it can be argued that non-proliferation is nec-
essary to ensure the very life of the international system.
Opponents ofjus cogens also argue that sovereign nations must
be free to deviate from general international legal principles through
specific agreements. Gaja argues, however, that treaty rights should
be divided into those that only affect the rights of the parties to the
treaty, and those with direct and exogenous effects on other na-
tions.6" In terms of the former, parties are given carte blanche to
58. See, e.g., G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 29 (1971);
Verdross, supra note 47, at 55-56.
59. See the arguments summarized in Alexidze, Legal Nature ofJus Cogens In Contempo-
rary International Law, 1981 RECUEIL DES COURs 244-45.
60. J. SINCLAIR, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 139 (1973); see also
C. ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 150-51 (1970).
61. Rao, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 14 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 378 (1974); see also Riesenfeld, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law:
In the Light of a Recent Decision of the German Supreme Constitutional Court, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 511, 513 (1966).
62. Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 1981 RECUEIL DES COURS (III) 280.
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formulate specific agreements, however, treaties falling into the latter
category are subject to limitations because of their exogenous effects.
If the right of sovereign nations to control their own affairs is a
paramount value,6 3 it is obvious that a bilateral agreement that ad-
versely affects the interests of a third party would contravene that
third party's sovereign rights. Thus, it must be presumed that even
the proponents of this laissez faire theory of treaties would have to
admit that when this right conflicts with the rights of third party
States, or perhaps also the overarching needs of the world commu-
nity, the rights of the latter must control. Protecting innocent third
party States, and the world community as a whole, from nuclear war
constitutes one of those interests from which derogation should not
be allowed.
A second problem with utilizingjus cogens in the context of nu-
clear weapons is that some analysts assert that nuclear weapons can-
not be considered illegal per se. Proponents of this position argue that
while certain uses, such as a first strike of nuclear weapons, might
violatejus cogens, mere possession would not.' To sanction such a
distinction could sound a death knell for the viability of NWFZ's. If
nations were allowed to develop nuclear weapons in the future, based
on their right to "possession," the danger of use, intentionally or ac-
cidentally, would remain.
There have been two primary arguments advanced in favor of
the legality of the possession of nuclear weapons. First, it has been
asserted that mere possession of nuclear weapons would not produce
the horrors associated with use, and thus possession in itself is not a
delict.65 However, given the ever present potential that these weap-
ons could be used, there should be a presumption against even
possession.
The more persuasive argument advanced in favor of the legality
of possession is that a nuclear first strike by one nation would justify
a nuclear response, usually denominated as the right of proportional
self defense.66 This argument has usually been applied in the context
of the nuclear superpowers, and therefore the validity of this reason-
63. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 210.
64. See Rubin, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, FLETCHER FORUM 50 (1984);
Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 MCGILL
L. REV. 542, 587-88 (1983); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 58, at 207; N. SINGH, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (1959).
65. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 64, at 49.
66. See Weston, supra note 64, at 577-78; Rostow, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear War,
76 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 26 (1982).
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ing when applied to many of the proposed NWFZ's is questionable.
If the nations in a region do not develop a nuclear capability, the
occasion to use such weapons in self defense against a regional oppo-
nent can, by definition, never arise. Employing such weapons in self
defense against a conventional attack would violate the international
legal principle of proportionality.6 7
It is also asserted that possession can be justified as a defense
against the possible use by a current nuclear power. Several re-
sponses to this argument can be proffered. First, it is extremely un-
likely that the United States, the Soviet Union or China would use
nuclear weapons against a nation without a nuclear capability. It is
not likely that one of the smaller nuclear powers, such as Britain or
France, would exercise this option either.6" It could be argued that
the real danger exists in terms of the "latent" or "emerging" nuclear
powers, who have not clearly established their own rules for the use
of such weapons. If such nations ratify a NWFZ treaty that prohib-
its the use, or threatened use, of such weapons against States in the
region the self defense rationale will be rendered nugatory.
B. Nuclear Weapons and Customary International Law
1. Standards for Finding a Principle of Customary Interna-
tional Law. A principle of customary international law "is based
upon the common consent of nations extending over a period of time
of sufficient duration to cause it to become crystallized into a rule of
conduct."6 9 In seeking to determine what principles are recognized
as international "rules of conduct" one must not only examine spe-
cific treaty commitments but also "pronouncements of foreign offices,
statements by writers, and decisions of international tribunals and
those of prize courts and other domestic courts purporting to be ex-
pressive of the law of nations."7
In perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of customary in-
ternational law to date, the International Court of Justice in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases7 established two primary require-
ments. The first requirement is quantitative in nature. In order for a
67. Badr, The Exculpatory Effect of Self Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 27 (1980); see also, R. Falk, Toward a Legal Regimefor Nuclear Weapons, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND LAW (A. Miller & M. Feinrider eds. 1984).
68. In support of this point, witness Britain's self-restraint in the Falkland's war with
Argentina, a war that many felt placed Britain's very credibility as a major power on the line.
69. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1940).
70. Id.
71. 1969 I.C.J. 3.
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principle to attain the status of a conventional rule of international
law, "State practice, including that of States whose interests are spe-
cially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform
in the sense of the provision invoked."
7 2
The Court has not precisely defined the number of States that
must participate in the practice before a rule of customary law can be
formed. However, in the context of the North Sea Continental Shelf
Case, and other decisions, it can be ascertained that the practice
should be accepted by a large majority of the nations of the world.7 3
In addition to the quantitative requirement, the Court in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case stressed the need to prove the sub-
jective element of opinio juris:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but
they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way as to be
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The States concerned must
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal
obligation.7 4
The opiniojuris requirement serves "to distinguish legal obliga-
tions from obligations derived from considerations of morality, cour-
tesy or comity. ' '75 The precise demonstration required to establish
opinio juris, however, remains ambiguous. Singh, for example, ar-
gues that a nation can be bound by an evolving principle of custom-
72. North Sea Continental Shelf Case 1969 I.C.J. 3. See also, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 91-92 (separate opinion of Judge de Castro).
73. Most legal scholars also agree that State practice need not be universal. Waldock, in
analyzing Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which outlines the
"sources" of international law, concluded that the article's reference to "general practice"
means that a principle need not be universally accepted to constitute customary international
law. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 1962 RECUEIL DES COURS (II) 44.
Akehurst's analytical approach is slightly different, but concordant with this position. He ar-
gues that the number of States necessary to create a rule of customary law varies according to
the amount of practice which conflicts with the rule. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of Interna-
tional Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 16 (1977). Akehurst's test ultimately requires proof of a
substantial consensus on any principle before it can be said to constitute customary interna-
tional law. The author would also accept the position that the prospective principle of custom-
ary international law should be recognized by a large cross section of States in both the socialist
and capitalist spheres of influence. Additionally, support from Third World nations should be
required because many do not consider themselves to be members of either of these ideological
camps. See Alexandrowicz, Empirical and Doctrinal Positivism in International Law, 47 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 286-89 (1977).
74. 1969 I.C.J. 73-74; see also the PCIJ's opinion in The Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A. No.
10 (1927) (opiniojuris can be found only if a State is conscious of a duty to follow an interna-
tional principle).
75. Akehurst, supra note 73, at 34.
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ary international law by acquiescence.7 6  Akehurst believes that
opinio juris can be derived not only from the belief by a State that a
principle is obligatory under law, but also under extra-legal norms
such as moral or social constructs." This position is supported by
many other commentators, particularly French scholars.7" It is clear
that, at the minimum, some kind of evidence of subjective commit-
ment is required to fulfill the opinio juris requirement.
Evidence of a principle of customary international law can be
derived from various sources, such as treaties, practices of interna-
tional organs, state legislation and national judicial decisions.7 9 This
discussion will now focus on some of the evidence that may support
the argument that nuclear proliferation violates customary interna-
tional law.
2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty as Customary International
Law. The Non-Proliferation Treaty may be construed as an embodi-
ment of customary international law. Under the principle of pacta
tertiis nocent nec prosunt, treaties only bind signatories, however, a
treaty may ripen into a principle of customary international law in
two ways. First, a treaty can serve as a declaration of customary
international law. In such cases:
[The Treaty] can be quoted as evidence of customary international
law even against a state which is not a party to the treaty. Such a
state is not bound by the treaty, but by customary international
law, therefore if it can produce other evidence to show that the
treaty misrepresents customary law, it can disregard the rule
stated in the treaty.8 °
76. "When a rule of customary international law results from the common practice of
States, it would not be incorrect to state that consent is latent in the mutual tolerations that
allow the practice to grow at all." SINGH, supra note 64, at 48-49; see also H. LAUTERPACHT,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 380 (1958);
L. GUGGENHEIM, TRAIT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 103-05 (2d ed. 1967).
D'Amato's theory of "articulation" is also consistent with this position.
The articulation of a rule of international law ... , in advance of or concurrently with
a positive act (or omission) of a State, gives the State notice that its action or decision
will have legal implications. In other words, given such notice, statesmen will be able
freely to decide whether or not to pursue various policies, knowing that their acts
may create or modify international law.
L. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1971); contra
Suganami, A. V Love on General Rules of International Law, 10 REV. INT'L STUD. 177 (1984).
77. Akehurst, supra note 73, at 34.
78. See generally Le Fur, Regles Gdndrales Du Droit De La Paix, 54 RECUEIL DES COURS
(IV) 5 (1935).
79. BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 5.
80. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (1982).
Vol. 16
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1986], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss2/9
NWFZ's: AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Second, a treaty may have a generative effect by crystallizing an
evolving principle of customary international law:
[Another] possibility is that the provision in the treaty constitutes
the first textual statement of a custom which had not previously
reached full maturity, but was what the Court has called an
emerging rule, a rule in statu nascendi. As a consequence of being
embodied in a treaty adopted at a Conference of the character al-
ready indicated that rule in statu nascendi ... crystallizes as a rule
of law.81
Under these standards the Non-Proliferation Treaty may be a
new source of customary international law, binding both signatories
and third parties. In terms of the requirement of extensive State
practice, 121 States have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with
broad representation of Western States, Communist States, and
Third World nations.8 2 The opiniojuris requirement is substantially
met by the language of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself which
states "that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously en-
hance the danger of nuclear war."83 This conscious affirmation of
the threat posed by nuclear proliferation goes beyond merely promis-
ing not to develop nuclear weapons. The signatories clearly declared
that such weapons cannot be developed, thus meeting the require-
ments of opinio juris.
The language of the Non-Proliferation Treaty serves as a decla-
ration of a principle of customary international law. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty's Preamble "urg(es) the cooperation of all States
in the attainment of this objective."8 4 This point is pressed further by
equating Non-Proliferation Treaty mandates with those found in the
Charter of the UN relating to the use of force, mandates that are
binding on all UN members, and perhaps even non-members.85
Perhaps the best examples to demonstrate this principle are the Hague Conventions concerning
rules of land warfare, and certain provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
81. Archega, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 1978 RECUEIL DES COURS
(I) 14-15, see also Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1972 I.C.J. 67.
82. Nye, supra note 4, at 125.
83. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 50, at Preamble.
84. Id.
85. The United States, along with many other nations, has also argued that the U.N.
Charter provisions bearing on the use of force are themselves reflective of preexisting custom-
ary international law. The Legality of U.S. Participation in the Defense of Viet Nan, 54 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 474, reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 565, 569 (1966). In terms of those few States
that are not members of the U.N., Article 2(6) of the Charter provides that "The Organization
shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with
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The Treaty can also be conceived of as a culmination of interna-
tional agreements intended to prevent proliferation in the last twenty
years, including the Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Sea
Bed Treaty, and the Antarctic Treaty. This view of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as the embodiment of a new principle of custom-
ary international law is corroborated by the fact that, "no new coun-
try has declared itself to be a nuclear power for more than 20 years
and none is known to have detonated a first nuclear test for over a
decade." 86
3. Customary Laws of War. A second source of customary in-
ternational law which may prohibit nuclear proliferation is embodied
in the international laws of war. These laws have historically occu-
pied an important place in international law because they are recog-
nized by virtually all nations as essential to the preservation of
certain human values.87 The governments of the world recently reaf-
firmed the binding nature of these laws by a unanimous vote.88
An analysis of several of the principles of the laws of war, as
embodied in multilateral treaties and conventions, serves to confirm
the illegality of using nuclear weapons. It should be noted that, while
most of these sources do not specifically address the issue of nuclear
weapons, the "Martens Clause" of the Hague Convention (IV) of
1907 provides for interstitial incorporation of new technologies.89
The binding nature of the Martens Clause was reaffirmed in both the
Geneva Convention of 1949, and Protocol I of the Geneva Conven-
tion in 1977.90
86. Spector, Silent Spread, 58 FOREIGN POL'Y 53 (1985).
87. Falk, Meyrowitz & Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 20 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 559 (1981).
88. Protocol of Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc.A/32/144, Aug. 15, 1977,
reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS (1977).
89. Until a more suitable code of the laws of war can be drawn up, the high con-
tracting parties deem it expedient to declare that in cases not covered by the rules
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and governance of the general principles of the laws of nations derived from usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates
of the public conscience.
Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV) Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1
Bevans 631. For analysis of the significance of the Martens Clause, see FALK, MEYROWITZ &
SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Princeton World Order Stud-
ies Program, Occasional Paper No. 10, 1980).
90. Roling, International Law, Nuclear Weapons Arms Control and Disarmanent in Miller
& Feinrider, supra note 67, at 184; see also the judgment of the U.S. Nuremberg War Crimes
Tribunal in the Krupp Case, July 31, 1948, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1343 (1950):
Vol. 16238
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a. Declaration of St. Petersburg and Hague Convention (IV).
Military officers at an 1868 conference formulated rules of warfare
that are still recognized today. The Declaration of St. Petersburg9'
established the principle that war must have limits and weapons that
cause excessive pain and suffering should be forbidden. 92 The provi-
sions of the declaration were important enough to be incorporated
into the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 which provides that "the
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not un-
limited,"93 and goes on to prohibit the use of "arms, projectiles or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." 94
Traditional laws of war, perhaps dating back to the 10th Cen-
tury Peace of God Proclamation mandate that "victory" in war is to
be obtained only by the defeat or surrender of the enemy's armed
forces.95 As a concomitant obligation, civilians are never to be made
an object of war.96 Thus, a weapon that is not, or cannot be, limited
to weakening the military forces of the opponent would contravene
both the Declaration of St. Petersburg and the Hague Convention
(IV).
Nuclear weapons are antithetical to these principles. Intrinsi-
cally, nuclear weapons are incapable of discriminating between com-
batants and civilians. One report concluded that if a force of 80,000
combatants were attacked with nuclear weapons over 180,000 people
would be killed from immediate effects and fallout. The report also
The Martens Clause is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause,
making the usages established among civilized nations, the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience into the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the
specific provisions of the (Hague) Convention IV and the Regulations attached to it
do not cover specific cases occuring (sic) in warfare, or concomitant to warfare.
Id.
91. Declaration of St. Petersburg, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L.
95 (Supp., 1907).
92. The Preamble provides:
Considering that the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating
as much as possible the calamities of war: That the only legitimate object which States
should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would therefore be contrary to the laws of
humanity.
Id.
93. Hague Convention, supra note 89, at art. 22. The Declaration was incorporated in
the Regulations annexed to the Convention.
94. Id. at art. 23(e).
95. L. FLYNN, MY COUNTRY RIGHT OR WRONG? 41-42 (1985).
96. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 58; see also E. CASTERN, THE PRESENT LAW OF
WAR AND NEUTRALITY 200 (1954).
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speculated that the civilian death toll could be far worse in develop-
ing nations where suboptimally constructed buildings and inadequate
supplies of medical personnel would substantially increase the
number of casualties.97 Even worse, national decisionmakers might
choose a countervalue targeting strategy, intentionally striking at ci-
vilian population centers and massively increasing the civilian
carnage.98
Some may argue that "tactical" nuclear weapons could still be
legal under the Declaration of St. Petersburg and the Hague Conven-
tion (IV) because they limit the amount of devastation. Even assum-
ing such mutual restraint between belligerants, tactical nuclear
weapons can only be considered "limited" when compared to strate-
gic nuclear forces.99 Thus, even the use of tactical nuclear weapons
would violate the principles of the Declaration of St. Petersburg and
the Hague Convention (IV) by inevitably producing unnecessary suf-
fering and devastation among combatants and civilians."°
The Hague Convention (IV) prohibits nations from employing
"poison or poisoned weapons" in war.'' Singh makes an excellent
case for the proposition that the forces unleashed by a nuclear
weapon would be "poisonous:"
Initial or immediate nuclear radiation consists of gamma rays,
neutrons, beta particles and a small proportion of alpha particles,
that is to say, of penetrating particles (neutrons) and gamma rays
which are directly harmful to human beings. Further, nuclear ra-
diation, or ionizing radiation, disrupts the complex combinations
of these elements (the atoms in the body) and thus changes the
proteins, enzymes and other substances that make up our cells and
bodies. As a result, the cells are injured or killed and bodily func-
tions can be affected; if enough cells are damaged or killed, the
97. Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, NUCLEAR WEAPONS 72
(1980); see also Arkin, von Hippel & Levi, The Consequences of Limited Nuclear War in East
and West Germany, 11 AMBIO 163-73 (1982).
98. Weston, supra note 64, at 687.
99. For example, the M1 10 self propelled howitzer can be used to fire "nuclear artillery."
However, the term "artillery" is deceptive. These nuclear shells are in the twelve kiloton range,
approaching the devastation of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War
II. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 369
(1952).
100. I T. COCHRAN, W. ARKIN & M. HOENIG, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK 306-07
(1984).
101. Hague Convention, supra note 89, at art. 23(a). Black's Law Dictionary defines the
term poison as "any substance having an inherent deleterious property which renders it when
taken into the system capable of destroying life, a substance which on being applied to the
human body internally or externally is capable of destroying the action of the vital func-
tions...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
Vol. 16
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person becomes seriously ill or dies. 1
0 2
Thus, the radioactive toxins released by nuclear weapons would nec-
essarily violate prohibitions against warfare by poisoning.
The Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 adds the prohibition of "as-
phyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids,
materials, or devices" in warfare.' 3 Under two different interpreta-
tions of the Protocol the use of nuclear weapons would contravene its
mandates. First, while radioactive fallout consists of particulates,
and not gases, Singh points out that fissionable products could fall
within the meaning of "gas" just as mustard gas, clearly within the
strictures of the Protocol, begins as a liquid but is converted into
gas. 104
Second, the Protocol prohibits not only the use of dangerous
gases but also all analogous liquids, materials or devices."0 ' The in-
clusion of this broad language in the Protocol indicates that the
drafters contemplated technologies that might be developed in the
future that would produce commensurate physical effects. Thus, the
characteristics of the weapon determine whether it is proscribed by
the Protocol. 6 Under this analysis, nuclear weapons are also illegal.
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the use of nuclear weapons
would produce symptoms and physical manifestations indistinguish-
able from the effects of poison. Thus, under the Geneva Protocol
nuclear weapons would be "analogous" to other poisonous weapons.
b. Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977 Protocols. The four
Geneva Conventions of 1949'07 enumerate various categories of peo-
ple and institutions that are to be protected or cared for during
102. SINGH, supra note 64, at 26.
103. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. 8061,
94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as Protocol]; see also Convention on the Prohibition, the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 585, T.I.A.S. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
104. SINGH, supra note 64, at 162-64.
105. Protocol, supra note 103.
106. Falk, Meyrowritz & Sanderson, supra note 87, at 563. This technique is often used in
treaties as a mechanism to control analogous weapons that might be developed in the future.
107. Geneva Convention (No. I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (No. II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (No. II1) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Con-
vention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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war.' °8 The 1977 Protocols (I & II) to the Geneva Convention0 9
amplify these mandates by providing more specific protections for
combatants and medical units." 0 The Protocols also provide for the
protection of civilian populations by prohibiting "indiscriminate at-
tacks" which include:
4.... (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective.
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects
of which cannot be limited as required by the Protocol.
5.... (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."'
The Protocols also prohibit attacks on objects deemed "indis-
pensable to the survival" of the civilian population, such as food-
stuffs, agricultural lands used to produce foodstuffs, crops, livestock
and drinking water installations." 2
A nuclear exchange between medium sized nations would most
likely result in the immediate deaths of hundreds of thousands. Of
those who survived hundreds of thousands or millions would be seri-
ously ill. Acute doses from immediate radioactive fallout and inter-
mediate-timescale fallout, along with internal doses from food and
drink, would threaten a massive "second wave" of deaths from radia-
tion sickness." 3 Even assuming that adequate medical personnel
would exist to cope with a disaster of these proportions, it is likely
that fallout would prevent them from helping those most in need of
such help.' Thus, nuclear weapons violate the mandate that medi-
108. The Convention (I) provides for protection of medical personnel such as doctors,
nurses and the Red Cross who seek to care for the sick and wounded on the battlefield. The
Convention (II) provides similar protections for medical personnel at sea. The Convention
(III) protects prisoners of wars, medical personnel who attend to their injuries and chaplains
who seek to comfort them. The Convention (IV) prohibits the terrorizing or coercing of civil-
ians in the hands of an occupying force. See Falk, Meyrowitz & Sanderson, supra note 87, at
570.
109. Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humani-
tarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I & II to the Geneva Convention, June 8,
1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977).
110. Id. at arts. 10-34.
111. Id. at art. 51.
112. Id. at art. 54.
113. Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe. Some Policy Implications, 62 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 271 (1984); see also Feld, Physical Effects of Nuclear War, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 401 (1983).
114. Fried, International Law Prohibits the First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 16 REVUE
BELGE DE DROIT I 40 (1981); see also Castren, The Illegality of Nuclear Weapons, 1971 U.
Vol. 16
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cal personnel be protected while they attend to the needs of the in-
jured by creating an environment in which they would always be in
peril. It should also be noted that the Geneva Convention (IV) re-
quires that civilian hospitals be protected from attack during war." 5
Because nuclear weapons would cause indiscriminate destruction this
mandate also could never be met.
Given the hazards of radiation, the use of nuclear weapons in
warfare would make immediate occupation of the losing nation, as-
suming that a "victor" emerged, impossible. Thus, under most sce-
narios there would not be "prisoners of war" in this devasted world.
Assuming, however, that a nation's forces could occupy the defeated
nation, it is obvious that they could not comply with the Geneva
mandate that prisoners of war be protected from further harm. "[A]s
a result of the devastation and contamination ... there would be few,
if any, locations sufficiently safe for a prisoner of war camp."' 16
The Geneva-mandated protection of civilian objects, such as
foodstuffs, crops, and water supplies would also be rendered impossi-
ble if nuclear weapons were employed. In the short term the use of
nuclear weapons would also devastate basic commodities, "people
would die of starvation, dehydration, and exposure to the ele-
ments. '""I7 The tremendous fires attendant to a nuclear conflagra-
tion, and subsequent runoff of topsoil, could devastate croplands for
years after the war." ' This diminution in food supply, combined
with the effects of radiation, would also substantially deplete the
ranks of livestock animals.' 9 Water supplies would also be contami-
nated by radiation and the destruction of water purification systems
would further exacerbate the crisis.
c. Genocide Convention of 1948. The use of nuclear weapons
would violate the principles of the Genocide Convention. 20 Geno-
cide is termed "a crime under international law,"' 2 ' and is defined as
an intent to destroy a "national, ethnical, racial or religious group by
TOL. L. REV. 97 ("treatment of the sick and wounded ... would become impossible to carry
out").
115. Geneva Convention (No. IV), supra note 107, at art. 18.
116. Meyrowitz, Falk & Sanderson, supra note 87, at 570.
117. Kerzner, Medical Consequences of Nuclear War in Miller & Feinrider, supra note 67,
at 396.
118. Sagan, supra note 113, at 271.
119. Id.
120. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
121. Id. at art. 1.
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a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; [or] c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion in whole or in part."'
122
It has been estimated, for example, that even a "limited" tactical
nuclear war would result in "five to six million immediate civilian
casualties." 123 An attack involving a single 100 kiloton nuclear war-
head would kill all people and destroy structures in a fifteen square
mile radius.124 A nuclear exchange could result in the mass execu-
tion of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of innocent human
beings; a clearer act of genocide is hard to conceive.
12
1
4. U.N. Resolutions and Customary International Law. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 1653 (XXVI) was adopted in 1961, declar-
ing that "any state using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be
considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting
contrary to the laws of humanity, and as committing a crime against
mankind and civilization."'' 2 6 This resolution has been subsequently
reaffirmed by even larger majorities in the General Assembly.
127
UN resolutions are not an independent source of customary in-
ternational law.' 28 Article 10 of the UN Charter itself states that the
General Assembly only issues "recommendations." However, UN
resolutions can be seen as a supplementary means to establish the
existence of customary principles, or to contribute to the generation
of such principles. These resolutions, when supported by substantial
majorities of States, constitute "evidence of the opinions of govern-
122. Id. at art. II.
123. Arbess, supra note 27, at 108.
124. Id.
125. It might be argued that in many scenarios the use of nuclear weapons would not
constitute an intent to commit genocide, as required in Article II of the Convention, rather
only a tragic, but unavoidable, result of the use of nuclear weapons. However, as Malone has
argued, "[the] proof of the consequences that may be reasonably anticipated from a party's
actions could be viewed as circumstantial evidence of a party's actual intent." Malone, The
Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility
Under International Law for Massacres of Civilian Populations, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 373, 431.
Additionally, Article II(C) prohibits "deliberate" acts, a less stringent mens rea standard.
126. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons,
G.A. Res. 1653, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
127. See Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, G.A. Res. 33/71-
g, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45), at 48, U.N. Doc. 2/33/45 (1978); see also G.A. Res.
35/152-0, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48), at 69, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).
128. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum, supra note 37, at 18. See also Johnson, The Effects of
Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97 (1955);
but see Akehurst, supra note 73, at 6.
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ments in the widest forum for the expression of such opinions. Even
when they are framed as general principles, resolutions of this kind
provide a basis for the progressive development of law and the speedy
consolidation of customary rules."' 29 UN resolutions are particu-
larly powerful evidence of customary international law when they
claim to be declaratory of existing international law.'3 UN Resolu-
tion 1653 can be said to be such a declaratory document because it
states that nuclear weapons are contrary to the "laws of humanity,"
and the UN Charter. 131
Overall then, the possession and/or use of nuclear weapons can
be said to violate customary international law. This would provide
the foundation in law for NWFZ signatories to enforce the agree-
ment against dissenters.
IV. ANCILLARY POLICY OPTIONS
Any effort to establish NWFZ's cannot operate in a political or
social vacuum. In addition to the quest for NWFZ agreements, there
are several other options that should be pursued. These alternatives
would operate synergistically with NWFZ proposals, strengthening
the potential for world peace.
A. Nuclear Weapon States Policy Options
The escalation of nuclear weapons development by the United
States and the Soviet Union adversely affects the prospects for stem-
ming nuclear proliferation, and concomitantly, the prospect for
NWFZ's in two ways. First, a disdain for arms control by the super-
powers only accentuates the claim of many nations that the super-
powers seek to maintain nuclear "hegemony."' 132 Second, emphasis
on "the nuclear card" in superpower strategies may encourage other
nations to acquire this option.
1 33
129. BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 14.
130. Akehurst, supra note 73, at 6.
131. Brownlie found Resolution 1653 to be an example of an important lawmaking resolu-
tion, BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 14.
132. Keohane, Hegemony and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1981 YRBK. WLD. AFF. 10. The
comments of former Indian Defense Minister Swaran Singh exemplify this position: "We can
never agree to sign a non-proliferation treaty ... which does not take note of vertical prolifera-
tion and which does not take us even a step further towards stopping the mad race of increasing
a nuclear arsenal of the superpowers and those who belong to the nuclear club." S. SINGH,
LOK SABHA DEBATES, 4th Series, Vol. XXXVII, (Mar. 11, 1970).
133. As Nye concluded, -[n]uclear doctrines and deployments that stress the military use-
fulness of weapons tend to make nuclear weapons look more attractive to others. If states that
have deliberately eschewed nuclear weapons see them treated increasingly like conventional
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Recognizing the continuing nature of this instability, it would be
advantageous to extract a pledge from the present nuclear nations
that they will never use nuclear weapons against nations not possess-
ing such weapons.' 34 Such a pledge would have the salutary effect of
negating the one arguably viable rationale that a nation might claim
for possessing nuclear weapons: self defense against a potential nu-
clear attack. As argued, the use of nuclear weapons against a non-
nuclear State would violate international legal norms related to the
proportionality of an attack.'35 A "no use" pledge would codify this
important international legal principle.
B. Removing Incentives to Proliferate
The rapidly escalating prices and eventual prospect of depletion
of non-nuclear energy resources, such as oil, natural gas, and coal,
have provided a substantial impetus to many nations to develop civil-
ian nuclear power programs. As a result, it is estimated that by the
end of the twentieth century more than half of all energy production
will be in the form of electricity, a high percentage of this generated
by nuclear power reactors.1 36 Unfortunately, the development of nu-
clear energy brings with it a concomitant threat of weapons develop-
ment because the technology used in nuclear power plants may be
diverted for the production of weapons quickly and inexpensively. 
137
The threat will always exist that even those nations which did not
originally plan to develop nuclear weapons might be tempted one day
in desperation to change their minds.
The threat of proliferation as an outgrowth of civilian programs
poses an agonizing dilemma for supplier nations of nuclear technol-
ogy. On one hand, the Non-Proliferation Treaty recognizes the "ina-
lienable rights of all parties to the treaty to develop research,
production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with-
defense weapons, they may one day reconsider their decisions." Nye, supra note 4, at 128; see
also R. FALK, MINIMUM WORLD ORDER 190 (1983).
134. Such a plan was proposed in 1979 as part of Protocol III to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, but was never acted upon. See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH IN-
STITUTE, POSTURES FOR NON-PROLIFERATION 139 (1979) [hereinafter cited as POSTURES FOR
NON-PROLIFERATION].
135. See supra notes 67-68 and acompanying text.
136. Edwards, International Legal Aspects of Safeguards and the Non Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, 33 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1 (1984).
137. Kincade and Bertram recently estimated that a nation with an enrichment or
reprocessing facility might assemble a nuclear bomb from materials diverted from a nuclear
power plant "in anywhere from a few hours to a few days." W. KINCADE & C. BERTRAM,
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE 1980's 161 (1982); see also Taylor, NUCLEAR PROLIFERA-
TION AND NEAR NUCLEAR COUNTRIES 117 (0. Marvah & A. Schultz eds. 1975).
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out discrimination." '138 Indeed, the Treaty strongly encourages the
nuclear technology "haves" to share peaceful technology with the
"have nots."' 39
Unfortunately, providing sensitive nuclear technology to many
nations poses the threat of materials diversion and weapons develop-
ment. Several proposals have been presented to avoid this dilemma.
The three approaches to slowing nuclear proliferation are technologi-
cal denial, dissuasion and regulated transfer." Technological denial
would preclude transfer of facilities that require weapons-grade
materials for their operation, and would also deny enrichment and
reprocessing technologies. Dissuasion would provide non-nuclear
States with alternatives to indigenous development of reprocessing
and enrichment technologies, thereby reducing the desire of States to
acquire these technologies. Regulated transfer would permit the
transfer of nuclear technology, but only when accompanied by inter-
national safeguards and pledges not to divert nuclear materials for
weapons developments.
It has been suggested that only the second alternative, dissua-
sion, is viable. The first alternative of technological denial is an obso-
lete policy option. Unlike the early years of nuclear reactor
technology, when the United States had a virtual monopoly, willing
suppliers have now become abundant.' 4 ' Additionally, enrichment
and reprocessing technology is already possessed by a large number
of nations which have the capability to develop enriched "carmel"
uranium and/or extract weapons-grade plutonium from spent
fuels. 142
The third alternative of regulated transfer also relies on a frail
reed. IAEA safeguards for detecting diversion of nuclear materials
and nuclear technology have proven inadequate. While the knotty
questions of effectively monitoring and inspecting nuclear facilities
arguably do not seriously denude State sovereignty, they remain un-
138. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 83, at art. 4.
139. Id. This requirement has been construed as a reciprocal pledge for those nations who
agree to renounce the development of nuclear weapons. See Grieg, The Interpretation of Trea-
ties and Article IV2 of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, 1980 AUST. YRBK. INT'L L. 78.
140. These three approaches are suggested by T. GREENWOOD, H. FEIVESON & T. TAY-
LOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 82-83 (1977).
141. Experience has shown that many of these nations are unreceptive to the idea of deny-
ing nuclear technology to nations that are willing to pay for it, or that are political allies.
France is perhaps the best example of a nation that chafes at any restriction which they feel
would deny them the "sovereign right" to transfer advanced nuclear technologies.
142. GREENWOOD, FEIVESON & TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 86; see also Fast Breeder
Reactor Starts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1985 at 23 (India's 40 megawatt breader reactor).
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answered. 143 Therefore, the strategy of dissuasion may be the only
effective middle-ground solution between total denial of nuclear tech-
nology, and free transfer. The hope of dissuasion is embodied in pro-
viding desirable alternatives to indigenous development of nuclear
technologies and processes.
Several analysts have proposed the establishment of Regional or
International Fuel Cycle Centers. 1 These centers would provide a
group of facilities and services, including reprocessing plants, enrich-
ment services, fabrication plants for mixed oxides, and waste man-
agement facilities. 141 Joint ownership of such facilities by suppliers
and recipients of peaceful nuclear technology might provide further
economic and political benefits to the recipient nations, fostering co-
operation and commitment to the plan.
The establishment of regional centers for the storage of pluto-
nium is another meritorious proposal. Under this plan recovered
plutonium would be stored at well-guarded facilities, perhaps jointly
owned by suppliers and recipients. Plutonium would then be shipped
in small quantities as needed, avoiding the risk of plutonium stockpil-
ing that could be used for quick diversion to nuclear weapons.
146
Each of these proposals could help meet the exigency of aiding
nations that genuinely wish only to develop a peaceful nuclear tech-
nology in the most inexpensive and efficient manner possible. Con-
comitantly, it would prevent nations that wish to covertly develop
nuclear weapons from using the inadequacy of regional or interna-
tional alternatives as a pretext to develop indigenous technologies.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate question that must be asked is whether it is possi-
ble to really stop the spread of nuclear weapons by finding them ille-
gal and establishing NWFZ's to enforce this determination. One less
than charitable colleague has suggested that this proposed frame-
work is utopian, and that instead we should heed the words of Soph-
ocles: "What you cannot enforce, do not command."'
147
However, public discussion and debate about the legal aspects of
nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation and NWFZ's can have an im-
143. See R. EHRLICH, WAGING NUCLEAR PEACE 339 (1985); Edwards, supra note 136, at
20.
144. ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TREATY: PARADOXES
AND PROBLEMS 14 (1975).
145. Edwards, supra note 136, at 19.
146. Id.
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pact on the policy choices of nations. If States believe that nuclear
weapons are illegal, and that NWFZ's present a hope for world
peace, cultural norms will gradually develop into legal norms against
nuclear armaments. One analyst has provided a dramatic historical
example of how such norm generation has influenced national policy:
Over time, the Geneva Protocol has substantially changed atti-
tudes, expectations and behaviour concerning chemical and bio-
logical weapons. By rendering such weapons politically
illegitimate, the Geneva Protocol has minimized the number of
States which explicitly rely upon them to achieve various military
security and political prestige objectives.
148
In a similar manner it is possible we may be able to convince
national leaders, and the citizens of these nations, that nuclear weap-
ons are repugnant to the international legal standards of the world
community. While the process may be slow, it is possible to create
norms that will eventually sound the death knell for nuclear weap-
ons. As one scholar has argued:
[T]he survival of states is first and foremost the precise function of
international law: establishing a framework of community norms
in which the legitimate rights of each state are protected. This
framework should not step aside once a crisis occurs. Interna-
tional law should not be discarded at the very moment it is most
needed ....149
148. POSTURES FOR NON-PROLIFERATION, supra note 134, at 47.
149. Tensions, supra note 11, at 490.
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